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made available through I.R.C. § 642(h), the amount in excess of 
the gross income is not deductible by the income beneficiary or 
beneficiaries of the trust.20 However, if the trust also terminates 
during the taxable year in which it is allowed the Section 642(h) 
deductions, the deductions in excess of gross income are available 
to the remainder holders succeeding to the property.21 Again, the 
deductions would be allowable to “beneficiaries succeeding to 
the property of the trust” but not to those with a mere income 
interest.22
 What if a trust beneficiary has the power to terminate the trust 
and, in fact, does so, in whole or in part, during the taxable year in 
which it is allowed the deductions allowed under  I.R.C. § 642(h)? 
It would seem that the deductions should be allowed to the trust 
to that extent. 
Excess deductions as itemized deductions
 It appears that the beneficiaries can claim the deductions only 
for the taxable year in which or with which the trust (or estate) 
terminates. If the deductions exceed the gross income, the excess 
may be carried over to a later year.23 Unused excess deductions 
for some expenses may be subject to the two percent floor.24 The 
future of the proposed  regulations remains unclear inasmuch as 
the proposed regulations were issued before the Supreme Court 
decision in Rudkin. Thus, excess deductions subject to the  two-
percent limit can be taken only to the extent that a beneficiary’s 
total miscellaneous itemized deductions exceed two percent of the 
beneficiary’s adjusted gross income  if the deductions are subject 
to the two percent limitation. 
Passive activity losses
 Passive activity losses distributed by an estate or trust are not 
allowable as a deduction “. . . for any taxable year.”25 Rather, the 
income tax basis of the interest distributed is increased by the 
amount of the passive activity losses  allocable to that interest.26
ENDNOTES
 1 I.R.C. § 172.
 2 I.R.C. § 1222.
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 BANkruPTCy
FEDErAL TAX
 DISCHArGE. The debtor owed taxes for 1998-2006 and 
sought to have the taxes declared dischargeable in a bankruptcy 
case filed in 2009.  The debtor filed all the returns late, filed 
multiple bankruptcy cases from 2005 through the present case, 
made several low offers in compromise, provided false information 
to the IRS, placed assets in the names of other persons, and initiated 
several other tax proceedings.  The debtor was employed during 
these years and had ample income to pay the taxes but spent the 
money on a residence and placed funds in a retirement account. 
The court found that the debtor had done most of these activities 
with the intent to hinder or delay the IRS collection of the taxes 
owed; therefore, the taxes were nondischargeable under Section 
523(a)(1)(C) for willful attempts to evade or defeat taxes. In 
re Acker, 2010-2 u.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,636 (E.D. Texas 
2010).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr
this limitation, the phrase “adjusted federal estate tax” means the 
amount of federal estate tax paid with respect to the transferor’s 
estate plus certain credits allowed the transferor’s estate. The phrase 
“transferor’s adjusted taxable estate” means the amount of the 
transferor’s taxable estate decreased by the amount of any “death 
taxes,” including federal and state estate taxes, paid with respect 
to the transferor’s gross estate. Unser Section 2013(c) the credit is 
limited to the difference between (1) the net estate tax payable with 
respect to the decedent’s estate, determined without regard to any 
credit under section 2013, and (2) the net estate tax determined as 
described immediately above but computed by subtracting from 
the decedent’s gross estate the value of the property transferred 
adjusted by any charitable deduction, if applicable. The credit is 
limited to the lesser of the two limitations. The court held that, in 
the calculation under the first limitation, the predeceased decedent’s 
taxable estate was not reduced by the applicable credit amount. 
The court disallowed any prior transfer credit for state estate taxes 
paid by the predeceased decedent’s estate because I.R.C. § 2013 
had no provision for such a credit. The court also disallowed any 
deduction for the decedent’s estate for payment of the federal and 
estate taxes by the predeceased decedent’s estate under I.R.C. § 
2053.  Estate of Le Caer v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. No. 14 (2010).
 DISCLAIMErS. The decedent’s will included a bequest to an 
heir of a portion of the residuary estate. The will provided that, if 
the heir predeceased the decedent, the heir’s share would pass to 
the heir’s children. The heir disclaimed the bequest and the property 
in the form of stock in several corporations, was transferred to the 
heir’s children. The IRS determined that, under Mississippi law, the 
disclaimed interest would not pass under the will but would pass 
under intestacy law because the will had no provision for passage of 
disclaimed property.  The court agreed with the IRS interpretation 
of Mississippi law and ruled that the disclaimed stock passed by 
intestacy back to the heir; therefore, the subsequent transfer of 
the stock to the children was a taxable gift.  Estate of Tatum v. 
united States, 2010-2 u.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,607 (S.D. Miss. 
2010).
 GENErATION-SkIPPING TrANSFErS. The grantor had 
established an irrevocable trust prior to September 25, 1985 which 
now had five beneficiaries.  The trustee obtain court permission 
to modify the trust to allow for distributions of trust corpus to a 
beneficiary for the “reasonable care, maintenance, or education, 
or on account of any illness, infirmity, or other life emergency.” 
The trustee also obtained court permission to divide the trust into 
five pro rata trusts, one for each beneficiary.  The IRS held that 
the modification of the trust and the division of the trust did not 
subject the trust to GSTT.  Ltr. rul. 201039003, June 25, 2010.
 FEDErAL INCOME 
TAXATION
 AMOrTIZATION. The taxpayer purchased a vineyard which 
was located in two viticultural areas designated as American 
viticultural area (AVA) by the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and 
FEDErAL FArM
PrOGrAMS
 FArM LOANS. The FSA has issued proposed regulations 
amending the Farm Loan Program loan making regulations 
to implement four provisions of the Food, Conservation, and 
Energy Act of 2008 (2008 Farm Bill). The proposed amendments 
rename, expand, and make permanent the Beginning Farmer and 
Rancher Land Contract Guarantee Pilot Program. The proposed 
amendments also change the farm experience requirements in 
the regulations for direct Farm Operating Loans and direct Farm 
Ownership Loans and make some equine farmers and certain 
equine losses eligible for Emergency Loans. 75 Fed. reg. 57866 
(Sept. 23, 2010).
 TuBErCuLOSIS. The APHIS has issued interim regulations 
amending the bovine tuberculosis regulations reclassifying the 
zone consisting of an area in the northwest corner of Minnesota 
as a modified accredited advanced zone, and the zone comprising 
the remainder of Minnesota as an accredited-free zone. 75 Fed. 
reg. 60586 (Oct. 1, 2010).
 FEDErAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXATION
 ADMINISTrATIVE EXPENSES. The estate had successfully 
adjudicated a refund for federal estate taxes, Keller v. United 
States, 2009-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,579 (S.D. Texas 2009), 
and filed claims for deduction for administrative expenses for 
accounting and legal services.  The court allowed the deduction 
for the claims except to the extent the claims were for contingency 
fees and future work because the court found these services not 
necessary for the administration of the estate.  keller v. united 
States, 2010-2 u.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,606 (S.D. Texas 
2010).
 CrEDIT FOr PrIOr TrANSFErS. The decedent’s 
predeceased spouse died less than three months before the 
decedent died. The predeceased spouse’s estate filed its estate tax 
return just over one month before the decedent’s estate’s return 
was filed. The decedent’s estate claimed a deduction for the federal 
and state estate taxes. Although the IRS agreed that the decedent’s 
estate was eligible for the prior transfer credit under I.R.C. § 2013, 
the parties disagreed as to the calculation of the credit and whether 
the credit included the state estate taxes paid by the predeceased 
decedent’s estate.  The decedent’s estate argued that the credit 
equaled all the federal and state estate taxes and the IRS argued that 
the credit was limited by I.R.C. § 2013(b) and (c). Section 2013(b) 
limits the credit to the amount which equals the value of transferred 
property multiplied by the transferor’s adjusted federal estate tax 
divided by the transferor’s adjusted taxable estate. For purposes of 
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Trade Bureau (“TTB”) of the United States Department of the 
Treasury under 27 C.F.R. § 9.11. In a Chief Counsel advice 
letter, the IRS ruled that a portion of the purchase price could 
be allocated to the right to use the AVA designation and that 
amount was amortizable as an intangible under I.R.C. § 197. 
The IRS reasoned that the AVA designation would come from 
the crop produced on the land and not result from any condition 
of the land itself. The IRS cautioned that the valuation of the 
amortizable interest would be difficult because other vineyards 
in the same area would also have the benefit from the AVA 
designation.  CCA Ltr. rul. 201040004, June 24, 2010.
 CAPITAL GAINS. The taxpayer had developed a method of 
transferring liquids from a vial directly to a medical syringe and 
had obtained a patent on the method. The taxpayer sold the patent 
to a medical equipment company for “$1 and for other good 
and valuable consideration.” Four months later, the taxpayer 
entered into a sales employment agreement with the medical 
equipment company. The taxpayer claimed the income from the 
employment as long-term capital gain from the sale of the patent 
but the IRS re-characterized the income as ordinary income 
from the employment. The court noted that the taxpayer had no 
evidence that the employment agreement was tied in anyway 
to the sale of the patent or that the employment had anything 
to do with the equipment company’s sale or use of the patent. 
Therefore, the employment income was not compensation for 
the patent and was properly characterized as ordinary income. 
Farris v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2010-222.
 CASuALTy LOSSES. The IRS has issued procedures 
which enable affected taxpayers to treat damages from corrosive 
drywall as a casualty loss and provides a ”safe harbor” formula 
for determining the amount of the loss. In numerous instances, 
homeowners with certain imported drywall have reported 
blackening or corrosion of copper electrical wiring and copper 
components of household appliances, as well as the presence of 
sulfur gas odors. The procedure provides the following relief: 
(1) Individuals who pay to repair damage to their personal 
residences or household appliances resulting from corrosive 
drywall may treat the amount paid as a casualty loss in the 
year of payment.   (2) Taxpayers who have already filed their 
income tax return for the year of payment generally have three 
years to file an amended return and claim the deduction. The 
amount of a loss that may be claimed depends on whether the 
taxpayer has a pending claim for reimbursement (or intends to 
pursue reimbursement) of the loss through property insurance, 
litigation or otherwise. (3) In cases where a taxpayer does not 
have a pending claim for reimbursement, the taxpayer may claim 
as a loss all un-reimbursed amounts paid during the taxable 
year to repair damage to the taxpayer’s personal residence and 
household appliances resulting from corrosive drywall.   (4) 
If a taxpayer does have a pending claim (or intends to pursue 
reimbursement), a taxpayer may claim a loss for 75 percent of 
the un-reimbursed amount paid during the taxable year to repair 
damage to the taxpayer’s personal residence and household 
appliances that resulted from corrosive drywall.  A taxpayer 
who has been fully reimbursed before filing a return for the year 
the loss was sustained may not claim a loss. A taxpayer who 
has a pending claim for reimbursement (or intends to pursue 
reimbursement) may have income or an additional deduction 
in subsequent taxable years depending on the actual amount 
of reimbursement received.  For purposes of the procedure, 
the term “corrosive drywall” means drywall that is identified 
as problem drywall under the two step identification method 
published by the Consumer Products Safety Commission and 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development in their 
interim guidance dated January 28, 2010. rev. Proc. 2010-36, 
I.r.B. 2010-42.
 The taxpayers, husband and wife, owned and operated a 
construction company. The taxpayers purchased a cabin and 
surrounding property and leased the property to their church 
for use as a teen camp, men’s retreat and women’s retreat. 
Although there was a written lease, the lease contained no 
rental terms or firm obligations and no rent was charged. The 
cabin and contents were damaged in a fire and the taxpayers 
claimed a casualty loss deduction.  The court held that the 
losses were not deductible under I.R.C. § 165(c)(1) because 
the property was not operated as a trade or business nor under 
I.R.C. § 165(c)(2) because the property was not operated 
with an intent to make a profit. The loss was not eligible for a 
personal casualty loss because it did not exceed 10 percent of 
the taxpayers’ adjusted gross income.  Sandoval v. Comm’r, 
T.C. Memo. 2010-208. 
 CHArITABLE DEDuCTION. The taxpayer purchased 
two properties in an historic district in Washington, D.C. and 
granted a facade conservation easement for both properties to 
a charitable organization. The taxpayer claimed a deduction 
for the loss of value to the properties. The taxpayer offered 
four appraisal reports but only one appraiser testified. That 
appraiser prepared an appraisal report four years after the grant 
of the easements and admitted to unfamiliarity with the IRS 
regulations for a qualified appraiser report and the appraisal 
had several errors and deficiencies under the regulations. 
No testimony was provided from the persons who prepared 
appraisals contemporaneous with the grant of the easements. 
The court held that the taxpayer failed to provide sufficient 
evidence of the difference in value of the proeprties before 
and after the grants of easement; therefore, the disallowance 
of the deduction was upheld.  Evans v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 
2010-207.
 COrPOrATIONS. 
 RETURNS. The IRS has issued proposed amendments to the 
regulations under I.R.C. § 6012 relating to the returns of income 
corporations are required to file. The proposed regulations 
require certain corporations to file a report of uncertain tax 
positions.  75 Fed. Reg. 54802 (Sept. 9, 2010). The IRS has 
announced that a final schedule and instructions are being 
released. In addition, the IRS is also releasing a directive 
regarding implementation of Schedule UTP and related matters, 
and a separate announcement regarding modifications that 
will be made to the existing Policy of Restraint in conjunction 
with implementation of Schedule UTP.  Based on comments 
received by the IRS, the final schedule and instructions make a 
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number of significant changes to the April 2010 draft in order to 
address burden and other concerns expressed by commentators. 
Some of the major changes include:
 • a five-year phase-in of the reporting requirement based on 
a corporation’s asset size;
 • no reporting of a maximum tax adjustment;
 • no reporting of the rationale and nature of uncertainty in 
the concise description of the position; and
 • no reporting of administrative practice tax positions.
 • removal of requirement to include rationale and nature of 
uncertainty in concise description of the position. Ann. 2010-
75, 2010-2 C.B. 428.
 The IRS has announced that the IRS is expanding its policy 
of restraint in connection with its decision to require certain 
corporations to file Schedule UTP, Uncertain Tax Position 
Statement, and will forgo seeking particular documents that 
relate to uncertain tax positions and the workpapers that 
document the completion of Schedule UTP. Ann. 2010-76, 
2010-2 C.B. 432.
 DEPENDENTS. In a Chief Counsel Advice letter, the IRS 
ruled that a domestic partner who is a dependent of an employee 
under I.R.C. § 152, is also a dependent for FUTA purposes. 
CCA Ltr. rul. 201040012, Sept. 8, 2010.
 The taxpayer claimed two children as dependents on a return 
using the head of household status. The one child was a minor 
and lived with the taxpayer’s former spouse. The divorce 
decree did not allocate the use of the dependency exemption 
and the former spouse did not agree to allow the taxpayer to 
use the exemption. The former spouse claimed the child as a 
dependent. The other child was age 30 and had income of over 
$13,000. The court held that the taxpayer was not entitled to 
claim either child as a dependent because (1) the taxpayer failed 
to prove that the young child lived with the taxpayer for more 
than one-half of the year and (2) the older child exceeded the 
age and income limitations for dependents. Louis v. Comm’r, 
T.C. Memo. 2010-217.
 DISASTEr LOSSES.  On September 28, 2010, the 
President determined that certain areas in the U.S. Virgin 
Islands are eligible for assistance from the government under 
the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 
§ 5121) as a result of a Hurricane Earl, which began on August 
29, 2010. FEMA-1939-Dr.  Accordingly, taxpayers in the 
areas may deduct the losses on their 2009 federal income tax 
returns. See I.R.C. § 165(i).
 EMPLOyEE EXPENSES. The IRS has announced an 
update of the simplified per diem rates that employers (or 
their agents or third parties) can use to reimburse employees 
for lodging, meals and incidental expenses incurred on or after 
October 1, 2010 during business travel away from home without 
the need to produce receipts. The simplified “high-low” per 
diem rates have decreased to $233 for high-cost localities and 
decreased to $160 for localities within CONUS. For purposes of 
applying the high-low substantiation method and the 50-percent 
limitation on meal expenses, the federal meal and incidental 
expense rate is treated as $65 for a high-cost locality and $52 for 
any other locality within CONUS. rev. Proc. 2010-39, I.r.B. 
2010-42, superseding, rev. Proc. 2009-47, 2009-2 C.B. 524.
 INNOCENT SPOuSE. The taxpayer filed for equitable 
innocent spouse relief, under I.R.C. § 6015(f), from joint tax 
liabilities created by the taxpayer’s and spouse’s joint income tax 
returns. The IRS denied equitable innocent spouse tax relief under 
Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(1) because the relief was requested 
more than two years after collection efforts had begun.  The court 
discussed the recent case of Lantz v. Comm’r, 2010-1 U.S. Tax 
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,446 (7th Cir. 2010), rev’g and rem’g, 132 T.C. 
131 (2009), under which the appellate court upheld the imposition 
of a two-year limitation period for requests for equitable innocent 
spouse relief. Reiterating its decision in Lantz, the Tax Court 
held that, although I.R.C. § 6015(b) and (c) have a two-year 
limitation period, the absence of a two year limitation period in 
I.R.C. § 6015(f) indicated Congress’ intent to allow equitable 
relief requests to be made for a longer, if not unlimited, period. 
Therefore, the court held that the two year period of limitations 
in Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(1) was invalid as to requests for 
equitable innocent spouse relief under I.R.C. § 6015(f). This 
case is appealable to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Hall v. 
Comm’r, 135 T.C. No. 19 (2010).
 While the taxpayer was married, the taxpayer’s spouse owned 
all the business assets and controlled all the financial affairs of the 
couple. The spouse had all the federal tax returns prepared and 
the taxpayer signed them without determining their accuracy. The 
taxpayer claimed that the taxpayer had no knowledge that taxes 
were not being paid. The taxpayer and spouse divorced and soon 
after the spouse died, the taxpayer filed for equitable innocent 
spouse relief. The IRS denied relief on the basis that the taxpayer 
did not show that the taxpayer had no knowledge that the taxes 
would not be paid and that the taxpayer would suffer economic 
hardship from paying the taxes. The court held that equitable 
innocent spouse relief should have been granted because (1) the 
taxpayer’s lack of knowledge of the couple’s finances prevented 
the taxpayer from knowing that the taxes would not be paid, and 
(2) the taxpayer had demonstrated that the taxpayer’s current 
income did not exceed the taxpayer’s reasonable living expenses. 
Harper v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2010-153.
 INVOLuNTAry CONVErSIONS. The IRS has issued 
guidance on determining the replacement period for application 
of I.R.C. § 1033(e) to the sale of livestock sold on account of 
drought. Notice 2006-82, 2006-2 C.B. 529. Under that guidance, 
under I.R.C. § 1033(e)(2)(B), the standard replacement period 
(four years after the close of the first taxable year in which any 
part of the gain from a drought sale occurs) can be extended by 
the Secretary of the Treasury if the Secretary determines that the 
drought area was eligible for federal assistance for more than 
three years.  The IRS, after consultation with the National Drought 
Mitigation Center, publishes in September of each year a list of 
counties for which exceptional, extreme, or severe drought was 
reported during the preceding 12 months. Taxpayers may use this 
list instead of U.S. Drought Monitor Maps to determine whether a 
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12 month period ending on August 31 of a calendar year includes 
any period for which exceptional, extreme, or severe drought 
is reported for a location in the applicable region. The IRS has 
published a list of the counties and parishes in the United States 
that have suffered exceptional, severe or extreme drought during 
the 12 months ending August 31, 2010, sufficient to extend the 
livestock replacement period. Notice 2010-64, 2010-2 C.B. 
421.
 PASSIVE ACTIVITy LOSSES. The taxpayer was employed 
full-time at a nuclear power plant. The taxpayer owned four 
residential rental properties which the taxpayer managed during 
non-working hours.  The taxpayer treated the four properties as 
one activity and claimed a loss deduction related to the rental 
properties on Schedule E but the IRS disallowed most of the loss 
deduction. The taxpayer argued that the taxpayer qualified for the 
I.R.C. § 469(c)(7)(B)(ii) exception for real estate professionals. 
The taxpayer presented evidence of 645 hours spent on the 
activities and argued that the number of hours spent on the rental 
activity included additional hours spent “on-call” for   work 
on the properties when the taxpayer was not working at the 
taxpayer’s full-time job. The court held that the “on-call” time 
could not be included because no services were performed on the 
rental properties. The taxpayer was allowed only a portion of the 
$25,000 exception under I.R.C. § 469(i) because the taxpayer’s 
gross income exceeded $100,000. Moss v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 
No. 18 (2010).
 PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in October 2010 for 
purposes of determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 
412(c)(7), the 30-year Treasury securities annual interest rate for 
this period is 4.28 percent, the corporate bond weighted average 
is 6.21 percent, and the 90 percent to 100 percent permissible 
range is 5.59 percent to 6.21 percent.  Notice 2010-70, I.r.B. 
2010-44.
 QuALIFIED MOrTGAGE INTErEST. An individual 
taxpayer purchased a principal residence for $1.5 million, with 
$300,000 cash and a $1.2 million mortgage loan.  The IRS 
ruled that the first $1 million of debt was qualified acquisition 
indebtedness for which interest was eligible for the residential 
mortgage interest deduction. The IRS also ruled that the interest 
on an additional $100,000 of indebtedness was eligible for the 
deduction as home equity indebtedness interest because the 
indebtedness was not considered acquisition indebtedness under 
I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B):
“(B) Acquisition indebtedness
   (i) In general
        The term ‘’acquisition indebtedness’’ means any indebtedness which -
     (I) is incurred in acquiring, constructing, or substantially improving any 
qualified residence of the taxpayer, and 
     (II) is secured by such residence.”
However, the IRS does not fully explain why the first $100,000 
of indebtedness above $1 million is not considered acquisition 
indebtedness. The IRS merely states that the definition of home 
equity indebtedness does not require that the indebtedness not 
be used to acquire the residence. This appears to contradict 
the statute which excludes acquisition indebtedness from 
the definition of home equity indebtedness. See I.R.C. § 
163(h)(3)(C):
“(C) Home equity indebtedness
      (i) In general
      The term ‘’home equity indebtedness’’ means any indebtedness (other than 
acquisition indebtedness) secured by a qualified residence to the extent the 
aggregate amount of such indebtedness does not exceed -
         (I) the fair market value of such qualified residence, reduced by
(II) the amount of acquisition indebtedness with respect to such 
residence. 
Query: It appears that the IRS sees only the first $1 million as 
acquisition indebtedness, with any additional indebtedness as 
other than acquisition indebtedness, thus opening up the additional 
indebtedness for qualification for home equity indebtedness. 
The interest on the remaining $100,000 of indebtedness was 
considered personal interest and was not deductible. The IRS 
acknowledged that this ruling was contrary to the holdings in 
Pau v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-43 and Catalano v. Comm’r, 
T.C. Memo. 2000-82, rev’d on other grounds, 279 F3d 682 (9th 
Cir. 2002). rev. rul. 2010-25, I.r.B. 2010-44.
 rETurNS. The IRS has announced that individual and 
business taxpayers will no longer receive paper income tax 
packages in the mail from the IRS. These tax packages contained 
the forms, schedules and instructions for filing a paper income 
tax return.  The IRS is taking this step because of the continued 
growth in electronic filing and the availability of free options to 
taxpayers, as well as to help reduce costs. In early October, the 
IRS will send a postcard to individuals who filed paper returns 
last year and did not use a tax preparer or tax software. The 
information will explain how to get the tax forms and instructions 
they need for filing their tax year 2010 return. The forms and 
instructions will be available in early January 2011. Notice 1400, 
1400-A, 1400-J, 1400-E.
 The IRS has published a draft Form W-2 for 2011, which 
employers use to report wages and employee tax withholding. 
The IRS also announced that it will defer the new requirement 
for employers to report the cost of coverage under an employer-
sponsored group health plan, making that reporting by employers 
optional in 2011.  The draft Form W-2 includes the codes that 
employers may use to report the cost of coverage under an 
employer-sponsored group health plan.  The Treasury Department 
and the IRS have determined that this relief is necessary to 
provide employers the time they need to make changes to their 
payroll systems or procedures in preparation for compliance 
with the new reporting requirement. The IRS will be publishing 
guidance on the new requirement later this year.  Although 
reporting the cost of coverage will be optional with respect to 
2011, the IRS continues to stress that the amounts reportable 
are not taxable. Included in the Affordable Care Act passed 
by Congress in March 2010, the new reporting requirement is 
intended to be informational only, and to provide employees 
with greater transparency into overall health care costs.  Notice 
2010-69, I.r.B. 2010-44.
 S COrPOrATIONS
 ACCOUNTING METHOD. The S corporation taxpayer 
attached to the federal income tax return, an original Form 3115, 
Application for Change in Accounting Method, filed under the 
grant jurisdiction in the Tax Court. Van Brunt v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Memo. 2010-220.
 TAX rETurN PrEPArErS. The IRS has announced a 
new online application system for tax return preparers to obtain 
a PTIN is now available.  All paid tax return preparers who 
prepare all or substantially all of a tax return are required to use 
the new registration system to obtain a PTIN.  Access to the 
online application system will be through the Tax Professionals 
page of www.IRS.gov. Individuals who currently possess a PTIN 
will need to reapply under the new system but generally will be 
reassigned the same number. Ir-2010-099.
 The IRS has adopted as final regulations governing the 
identifying numbers to be used by tax return preparers on tax 
returns prepared for other taxpayers.  Tax return preparers will 
need to apply and pay for a preparer tax identification number 
(PTIN) which may not be the preparer’s social security number. 
In keeping with the announced program to register all tax return 
preparers who are not attorneys, CPAs, or enrolled agents, only 
those individuals and registered tax return preparers will be given 
PTINs. 75 Fed. reg. 60309 (Sept. 17, 2010).
 The IRS has adopted as final regulations which impose a $50 
user fee on tax return preparers who obtain a new or renewed 
preparer tax identification number (PTIN).  The fee will pay for 
federal tax compliance and suitability checks to be performed 
on all individuals who apply for or renew a PTIN. 75 Fed. reg. 
60316 (Sept. 30, 2010).
 The IRS has announced the delay, until further notice, of 
the renewal period for enrolled agents whose tax identification 
number ends in a 4, 5 or 6 that was scheduled to begin on 
November 1, 2010. The IRS is currently implementing the 
recommendations in Publication 4832, Return Preparer 
Review, which was published on January 4, 2010. As part of the 
implementation, the IRS published regulations that require all 
individuals who apply for or renew a PTIN to pay a $50 user fee, 
plus a separate fee of $14.25 to the vendor. The IRS is delaying 
the upcoming renewal period for these enrolled agents to ensure 
that the revised user fee to renew enrollment as an enrolled agent 
is effective before the start of the next renewal period. The IRS 
will publish a schedule for affected enrolled agents to renew their 
enrollment in the Internal Revenue Bulletin and on the IRS Office 
of Professional Responsibility (OPR) webpage (http://www.irs.
gov/taxpros/agents/index.html). Once the IRS has determined 
a date for the renewal period the schedule will be published at 
least 30 days prior to the beginning of the revised enrollment 
period and affected enrolled agents will have between 60 and 120 
calendar days to submit the required renewal applications. OPR 
will not accept or process applications for renewal of enrollment 
until the enrollment renewal period has been announced. This 
delay will not impact an affected enrolled agent’s current status 
as an enrolled agent in good standing, the number of hours of 
continuing professional education required for renewal or the 
time period within which these hours must be completed. Ann. 
2010-81.
 TrADE Or BuSINESS. The taxpayer was employed at a car 
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automatic procedures of Rev. Proc. 2008-52, 2008-2 C.B. 587, 
as amplified, clarified, and modified by Rev. Proc. 2009-39, 
2009-2 C.B. 371. The taxpayer filed Form 3115 to change the 
method of accounting for certain depreciable property.  The 
taxpayer relied on its accounting firm to file a copy of the Form 
3115 (with signature) with the IRS national office, but the copy 
was not filed with the IRS national office as required by section 
6.02(3)(a) of Rev. Proc. 2008-52. The IRS granted an extension 
of time to file a copy of From 3115 with the national office.  Ltr. 
rul. 201039006, July 1, 2010.
 The taxpayers, husband and wife, were the sole shareholders 
of two S corporations. The retail corporation sold merchandise 
acquired from the wholesale corporation. The retail corporation 
did not pay the wholesale corporation for the merchandise and 
merely increased its accounts payable. The retail corporation used 
the accrual method of accounting and the wholesale corporation 
used the cash method of accounting. The IRS disallowed the retail 
corporation’s use of cost of goods sold because the corporation 
did not include its sales in income. The IRS sent a notice of 
deficiency to the taxpayers for a closed tax year, based on the 
disallowance of the use of cost of goods sold. The court held 
that the notice was proper in that it was based on an I.R.C. § 
481 adjustment in accounting method which was not subject to 
the limitations of a closed tax year. Bosamia v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Memo. 2010-218.
 SHAREHOLDERS. The taxpayer was an S corporation 
which had a resident alien as a shareholder. The shareholder 
lost the resident alien status, resulting in termination of the S 
corporation status. The taxpayer reacquired the shares of the 
ineligible shareholder and all other shareholders treated the 
taxpayer as an S corporation. The IRS ruled that the termination 
was inadvertent and did not result in loss of S corporation status. 
Ltr. rul. 201040001, July 8, 2010.
 TRUSTS. An irrevocable trust was created which provided 
that, under the trust agreement, whenever a gift was made or 
was deemed to have been made to the trust during the grantor’s 
lifetime, the beneficiary had the power to withdraw out of the 
assets of the trust an amount not to exceed the amount of such 
gift, provided, however, that the amount that could be withdrawn 
in any one calendar year was limited to the maximum amount 
as to which the power of withdrawal could lapse without the 
lapse constituting the release of a general power of appointment 
under I.R.C. §§ 2041(b)(2) and 2514(e). The IRS ruled that the 
beneficiary of the trust would be treated as the owner of the trust 
under I.R.C. § 678 and that the trust was an eligible S corporation 
shareholder. Ltr. rul. 2010-39010, June 29, 2010.
 TAX COurT. The taxpayer received a notice of deficiency 
on May 12, 2009 but the Tax Court did not receive the filing of a 
petition until November 12, 2009, 184 days after the notice and 
well beyond the 90 day appeal period. The taxpayer provided 
evidence from the postal store that the original petition was timely 
mailed but was damaged by the Post Office and returned to the 
taxpayer on November 3, 2009. The taxpayer mailed a new copy 
three days later. The court held that the taxpayer sufficiently 
proved a timely mailing of the original petition sufficient to 
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dealership as a sales manager. The taxpayer was able to obtain 
new cars at a discount, use the cars for personal use and then 
offer them for sale at a profit. The taxpayer placed a for sale sign 
on the cars immediately after acquiring them. However, almost 
all of the cars were traded-in to the dealership for new cars.  The 
taxpayer claimed income and expenses for the purchases and 
trade-in/sales on Schedule C.  The court held that the activity did 
not amount to a trade or business because the use of the vehicles 
was for personal use only and the taxpayer did not offer the cars 
for sale to the public, other than the signs in the cars. Sada v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2010-146.
 TrAVEL EXPENSES. The taxpayer was a plumber/pipefitter 
and a member of the Washington, D.C. plumbers’ union. The 
taxpayer moved to Florida to live with an ill parent during the 
tax years involved here. The taxpayer worked on several jobs in 
a variety of locations in and outside of the Washington area. The 
taxpayer claimed travel expenses for driving to the jobs from 
the Florida address. The court held that Washington, D.C. was 
the taxpayer’s tax residence for purposes of the deductibility of 
the travel expenses because the taxpayer remained a registered 
member of the local union and obtained several jobs in that area. 
Summerfield v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2010-143.
 The taxpayer was employed as a heavy equipment operator by 
two companies at several work sites in the state. The taxpayer 
claimed Form 2106 employee business expenses for travel and 
meals. The taxpayer also claimed deductions for work gloves, 
boots and a cellular telephone. The taxpayer had no written 
records to substantiate any of the expenses. However, the taxpayer 
presented records created and maintained by the two employers as 
to the taxpayer’s work periods and locations. The court allowed 
those records as sufficient substantiation of some of the travel 
expenses. The deduction for the cell phone was denied for lack 
of written records. The deduction for the work gloves and boots 
was reduced because the court felt they exceeded the reasonable 
costs of those items.  Holland v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 
2010-132.
 TruSTS. The taxpayer created a qualified personal residence 
trust which initially provided for distribution of the trust residence 
to the remainder holders, the grantor’s children. The taxpayer 
obtained a modification of the trust to provide that, upon the 
termination of the trust, the remainder holders had a power of 
appointment which could be used to direct the trustee to amend 
the trust to give the taxpayer a term interest in the trust property 
as a gift from the remainder holders. The trust terminated and the 
remainder holders exercised the power of appointment. The IRS 
ruled that, because the modification was similar to the sample 
given in Rev. Proc. 2003-42, 2003-1 C.B. 993, Section 4, the 
modification did not subject the trust to the special valuation rules 
of I.R.C. § 2701(a)(2).  Ltr. rul. 201039001, June 28, 2010.
NEGLIGENCE
 rES IPSA LOQuITur. The plaintiff was injured by falling 
through a dock on a pond on a farm owned by the defendants. 
The defendants had the dock removed because it was a hazard and 
was no longer used. The plaintiff argued that the negligence of the 
defendant was proved by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because 
the accident would not ordinarily happen without the negligent 
upkeep by the defendants. The trial court granted summary 
judgment for the defendants and the lower appeals court upheld 
the judgment, holding that there were other causes of the accident 
beyond mere negligence by the defendants. The Washington 
Supreme court reversed holding that res ipsa loquitur may be 
used to prove negligence where (1) the accident or occurrence 
that caused the plaintiff’s injury would not ordinarily happen in 
the absence of negligence, (2) the instrumentality or agency that 
caused the plaintiff’s injury was in the exclusive control of the 
defendant, and (3) the plaintiff did not contribute to the accident 
or occurrence.  In this case, the court held that the plaintiff had 
demonstrated that all three elements existed sufficient to prevent 
summary judgment. Curtis v. Lein, 2010 Wash. LEXIS 809 
(Wash. 2010), rev’g, 206 P.3d 1264 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
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